SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT UPDATE REPORT



SUDAN/DARFUR

Expected Developments

On 21 September, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairman Alpha Konaré will host a high-level consultation on Darfur. The adoption of a communiqué is expected.

The discussions—which will be influential in terms of positions likely to be taken by Security Council members at upcoming Council meetings, including the summit-level session on Africa on 25 September—are likely to address:

- the preparations for the upcoming Darfur peace talks currently scheduled for 27 October in Libya, including participation, format and structure of the talks;
- ceasefire issues;
- peacekeeping issues, in particular the deployment of the UN-AU hybrid operation (UNAMID); and
- the humanitarian situation.

Discussions are also expected to take into account the preparations for Council-mandated international deployments in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Some participants are also likely to be looking for progress on key outstanding issues on justice and accountability.

Preparations for the 21 September High-Level Meeting

The high-level meeting comes in the aftermath of the Secretary-General's trip to Sudan, Chad and Libya in early September. Both are part of a larger strategy to consolidate momentum and support for the initiatives on political reconciliation and peacekeeping.

The high-level meeting is also seemingly seen as an opportunity for exchanging ideas on key outstanding issues—such as participation in and modalities for the peace talks and UNAMID's deployment schedule—as well as for taking stock of the humanitarian situation.

The meeting is expected to include UN and AU envoys Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit, Under Secretaries-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno and John Holmes, as well as representatives from Sudan, key regional stakeholders and international partners, including the Council's permanent members.

Key Issues

A number of key issues regarding Darfur will certainly be in the minds of Council members in preparation for the summit-level meeting on 25 September. Participants on 21 September will be aware of the current deterioration in humanitarian conditions, in particular regarding the recent clashes between government and rebels with reports of aerial bombings as well as inter-rebel and communal fighting.

Some of the current and most pressing questions concern how best to ensure success in political reconciliation, in particular:

• Participation in the Tripoli Talks: how best to ensure legitimacy and the representation of key groups

is a key question. Some (such as Abdul Wahid al-Nur) continue to refuse to attend, and others may refuse in the future depending on whether there is genuine progress toward a ceasefire. The leadership of some key groups (such as the Justice and Equality Movement) seems increasingly fragmented and/or disconnected from field commanders;

- **Participation of Key Constituencies**: the planned peace talks currently seem intended to mostly comprise rebel leaders, but a key issue will be how best to incorporate the wider views of communities on the ground and other constituencies such as the internally displaced and also the Arab communities whose interest may not otherwise be represented. (Some observers have suggested reviving the idea of a Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation.)
- Cessation of Hostilities and Monitoring: how best to ensure a ceasefire is increasingly seen as a key element in ensuring the success of talks. A consequential issue is how best to revive existing monitoring mechanisms in the context of the transfer of responsibilities from the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to UNAMID. Another is how best to address the issue of militia activity outside the control of the parties;
- Negotiation Modalities: how best to manage the peace process and avoid past mistakes is another issue, in particular regarding timing (such as whether to rely on deadlines) and substance (including how best to address in the talks critical issues such as land, which previously was included simply as one aspect in wealth-sharing but is now increasingly seen to be a much more complex issue given the realities in Darfur);
- Format and Structure of the Talks: how best to manage the involvement of concerned UN members in the talks, and whether the Security Council has a role to play.

On peacekeeping, the key issue continues to be how best to manage the practical challenges of the phased deployment of UNAMID, including:

- generating sufficient high-quality troops and adequate assets;
- managing the continuing need for cooperation from Khartoum and coordination between the AU and the UN;
- timing, particularly since UNAMID may only be fully deployed by mid-2008 at the earliest; a related issue is coordinating with future deployments in Chad and the CAR and outcomes from the Tripoli peace talks;
- securing funding commitment from the General Assembly for the expected US \$2.6 billion, which would make UNAMID the costliest UN peacekeeping operation in history;
- UNAMID's unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges; and
- potential differences of view on UNAMID's mandate, especially to protect civilians, and problems with
 associating it too closely with the Darfur Peace Agreement, which could be seen by non-signatories as
 taking sides.

An underlying issue, which has been left in a low-key status while political accommodations were being forged, is how and when to address the outstanding justice and reconciliation issues. (The Council's referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in resolution 1593 took place in March 2005. The Council also then decided that "the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor." For two and a half years the issue has been treated as a matter for the Prosecutor and not for political action by the Council. During this period the ICC machinery has been proceeding, with two individuals already charged.)

But an important recent development is the appointment by Khartoum of ICC indictee Ahmed Mohammad Haroun to head a national human rights committee. This may be seen as evidence of a breach of resolution 1593 and bringing the issue back to the political sphere thereby raising a consequential issue regarding the need for the Council and the Secretariat to look into the implementation of resolution 1593.

This development also seems to have brought to the surface a wider issue of how best to harmonise other outstanding issues (including justice issues and the future of the sanctions regime) with existing initiatives on Darfur, including peacekeeping, political reconciliation and regional relations. Important related questions

include the cooperation of UNAMID and the future mission in Chad and the CAR with the sanctions panel of experts and the ICC.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID.
- S/RES/1755 (30 April 2007) extended UNMIS until 31 October 2007.
- S/RES/1672 (25 April 2006), 1591 (29 March 2005) and 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions in Darfur.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2007/517 (30 August 2007) was a recent report on UNAMID's deployment.
- S/2007/500 (20 August 2007) was the latest quarterly UNMIS report.
- S/2007/462 (27 July 2007) was the latest monthly report on Darfur.
- S/2007/307 (23 May 2007), Rev. 1 (5 June 2007) and Add. 1 (5 July 2007) contained the AU-UN recommendations on the hybrid operation.

Other

- S/PV.5727 (31 July 2007) was the record of the adoption of resolution 1769.
- CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3/CRP.1 (26 July 2007) contained the recent Human Rights Committee observations on Sudan.

Other Relevant Facts

UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Rodolphe Adada (Congo)

UN and AU Special Envoys

UN: Jan Eliasson (Sweden)

AU: Salim A. Salim (Tanzania)

UNAMID: Size and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 observers and liaison officers, and up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units
- Expected cost: US \$2.6 billion

UNAMID: Duration

31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2008

AMIS: Size and Composition

- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
- Strength as of 23 May 2007: 6,143 military and 1,360 police
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

AMIS: Duration

25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007